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“Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned and Forsaked": Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and International Human Rights Law as Applied to Prisoners 
and Detainees by Forensic Psychologists. 
 
Astrid Birgden 1 and Michael L Perlin2 
 
Objectives.  There has been an explosion of interest in therapeutic 
jurisprudence as both a filter and lense for viewing the extent to which the legal 
system serves therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.  However, little 
attention has been paid to the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence on questions 
of international human rights law and the role of forensic psychologists.  The 
paper aims to provide an intersection between human rights, therapeutic 
jurisprudence, and forensic psychology. 
 
Method:  Human rights are based on legal, social, and moral rules.  Human 
rights literature generally considers legal rights but such policy statements do not 
provide principles to guide forensic psychologists in addressing moral or social 
rights.  Therefore, a framework to guide forensic psychologists is required. 
 
Conclusion.  As duty-bearers, forensic psychologists need to address the core 
values of freedom and well-being in rights-holders (in this instance, prisoners and 
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detainees with a mental illness).  The paper proposes that human rights 
principles can add to the normative base of a therapeutic jurisprudence 
framework, and in turn, therapeutic jurisprudence can assist forensic 
psychologists to actively address human rights.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Human rights violations arise because lack of respect for the individual’s rights 
and dignity.  There is a significant and disturbing “disconnect” between the two.  
Even though forensic psychologists have at least 60 discrete opportunities to 
come in contact with the criminal justice system (from testifying in court about the 
defendant’s cognitive capacity to providing rehabilitation in corrections), the 
literature is “strangely silent” on whether forensic psychology practice meets 
human rights standards (Perlin, 2005), a silence that is both shameful and 
baffling (Perlin, 2006). Fellner (2006) estimates that in the United States 16 
percent of adults in prisons and gaols have a mental illness, this rate is two to 
four times the general population, there are three times as many individuals 
incarcerated in prison as in mental health hospitals.  Likewise, Ogloff (2002) 
reviewed available data in Australia and New Zealand and concluded that the 
prevalence of mental illness amongst prisoners is significantly higher than the 
general population.  In both countries, the rate of prisoners with mental illness is 
also increasing.  Prisoners with mental illness are more likely to violate prison 
rules leading to disciplinary hearings, inappropriate sanctions, and segregation 
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(Fellner, 2006).  Therefore, the application of human rights principles to prisoners 
and detainees with a mental illness will be the focus of the paper.   
 
An open question to be addressed is whether therapeutic jurisprudence might 
assist forensic psychologists to actively address human rights.  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence, human rights, and forensic psychology can intersect in terms of 
therapeutic jurisprudence and human rights (Ward & Birgden, 2007), therapeutic 
jurisprudence and forensic psychology (Birgden & Ward, 2003), and human 
rights and forensic psychology (Perlin, 2005, 2006).  In common, therapeutic 
jurisprudence, human rights, and forensic psychology rights are normative, 
humanistic (with a concern for well-being), and inter-disciplinary.  A normative 
approach conceptualises problems, seeks solutions, and specifies values that 
are foundational for a particular profession (Madden & Wayne, 2002).  
Therapeutic jurisprudence provides a useful interdisciplinary discourse- political 
theory and science, sociology, law, philosophy, biology, cultural studies, 
anthropology, and psychology- on human rights (Ward & Birgden, 2007).  Both 
therapeutic jurisprudence and human rights can guide forensic psychologists in a 
normative approach (e.g., under what circumstances involuntary psychological 
treatment may be acceptable), a humanistic approach (forging a therapeutic 
alliance based on an ethic of care), and an inter-disciplinary approach (a 
collaborative approach with other disciplines).   
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In particular, human rights and therapeutic jurisprudence involve two 
complementary justifications (Kress, 1999; Schopp, 1993; Ward & Birgden, 
2007).  The consequential justification respects the utility of human rights in 
appealing to both individual and community rights.  A consequentialist approach 
sanctions the suspension of human rights if a cost-benefit analysis indicates that 
this will result in a greater amount of the value in question for the individual (e.g., 
well-being).  In terms of autonomy, the consequences of decisions in promoting 
or undermining it are considered and concern for individual well-being demands 
the development of autonomous capacities.  The deontological justification 
appeals to the dignity of human beings and argues that it is never appropriate to 
violate human rights.  That is, the state and individuals have a duty to recognise 
the inherent value and worth of rights-holders.  In terms of autonomy, this means 
respect for self-regarding choices made by a moral competent individual is more 
important than the consequences and autonomy rights override individual and 
community rights.  The law is designed to protect freedom and promote well-
being by providing care and treatment to those who require it.  However, 
sometimes the consequentialist and deontological arguments for autonomy 
conflict such as when a prisoner with mental illness refuses treatment.  On the 
one hand, an ethic of care assumes shared informed decision-making with the 
right to refuse treatment after weighing the choices.  On the other hand, where 
there is a conflict between autonomy and well-being, the state either respects the 
individual’s choice at the expense of well-being or overrides the individual’s 
choice in order to promote well-being.  Whether a legal system should be 
5 
 
 
concerned with autonomy is a normative question but at present it is expected 
that individuals should be protected in this way as it is a basic moral obligation 
(Haney, 2002; Winick, 1992).  Therefore, autonomy is a human rights issue that 
forensic psychologists ought to concern themselves with. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Human rights are held by every individual in the international community as an 
autonomous agent, capable of formulating his or her own personal plans and 
seeking ways of realising them in daily life (Ward & Birgden, 2007).  Recognition 
of the inherent dignity and inalienable rights of all members of the human family 
“is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world” (Kumar, 2003; 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993; Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948).  Through “global” international covenants, individual rights 
are safeguarded against “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” treatment or punishment 
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 7, 1966), prisoners 
should be treated with humanity and dignity, and “reformation and social 
rehabilitation” should be provided (International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Article 10, 1966), and individuals are guaranteed “the right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health” (International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12, 1966).  More specialised United 
Nations Conventions guarantee “respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” in forensic and correctional systems (Vienna Declaration on Crime 
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and Justice, 2001), mandate that persons in detention or imprisonment be 
provided “medical care and treatment” (Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons Under Any Form of Detention of Imprisonment, Principle 6, 1988), and 
specify that persons with disabilities not be subjected to “exploitation, violence 
and abuse” (Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 16, 
2006).  Judicial decisions from the European Court of Human Rights and from 
federal cases in the United States have incorporated these principles (see Perlin 
& Dlugacz, 2007.  Therefore, there is no longer any question that prisoners have 
enforceable human rights (Robbins, 2006; Fellner, 2006).   
 
As previously stated, there is an overrepresentation of individuals with mental 
illness in prisons.  In the past three decades the relationship between human 
rights and persons institutionalised because of mental illness has become robust. 
 Important developments include the following: the United Nations General 
Assembly has adopted the “Mental Illness Principles”; the European Court on 
Human Rights has decided multiple cases reaffirming basic and fundamental 
rights in the commitment and institutionalisation process; mental disability-
focused NGOs such as Mental Disability Rights International and the Mental 
Disability Advocacy Centre have called the world's attention to the examples of 
inhumane treatment discussed above; “global” NGOs such as Amnesty 
International have finally acknowledged that violations of the rights of persons 
institutionalised because of mental disability are, indeed, international human 
rights violations; the World Health Organisation has published a Resource Book 
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on Mental Health, Human Rights and Legislation; academics and activists have 
begun to create theoretical frameworks through which these problems can be 
addressed (Lewis, 2002; Rosenthal & Kanter, 2002; Rosenthal & Rubenstein, 
1993) and, most importantly, the United Nations has recently adopted a new 
Disability Rights Convention (Perlin, 2007; see generally, Perlin, Kanter, 
Treuthart, Szeli, & Gledhill, 2006).  Forensic psychologists have a duty to put 
these requirements into practice otherwise such treaties remain policies on 
paper. 
 
In relation to prisons, Zinger (2006) states that the best approach to ensure that 
the rule of law is upheld is to view corrections as being in the human rights 
business.  The author states that  
 
The best argument for observing human rights standards is not merely 
that they are required by international or domestic law but that they 
actually work better than any known alternative - for offenders, for 
correctional staff, and for society at large. Compliance with human rights 
obligations increases, though it does not guarantee, the odds of releasing 
a more responsible citizen. In essence, a prison environment respectful of 
human rights is conducive to positive change, whereas an environment of 
abuse, disrespect, and discrimination has the opposite effect: Treating 
prisoners with humanity actually enhances public safety. Moreover, 
through respecting the human rights of prisoners, society conveys a 
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strong message that everyone, regardless of their circumstance, race, 
social status, gender, religion, and so on, is to be treated with inherent 
respect and dignity. (p 127)  
 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is a framework developed by Professors David Wexler 
and Bruce Winick with a particular concern for the psychological well-being of 
individuals who are in contact with the law (whether defendant, victim/survivor, 
witness, judicial officer, lawyer, or court staff).  Therapeutic jurisprudence is part 
of a growing comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing more 
humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues 
collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully (Daicoff, 2000).  These alternative 
approaches optimise the psychological well-being of individuals, relationships, 
and communities dealing with a legal matter, and acknowledge concerns beyond 
strict legal rights, duties, and obligations.  In its aim to use the law to empower 
individuals, enhance rights, and promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence 
has been described as "…a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of 
law…a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of 
law…which emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism" 
(Brookbanks, 2001, p. 329-330).  That is, therapeutic jurisprudence supports an 
ethic of care. 
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Therapeutic jurisprudence evaluates law on the basis of its therapeutic and anti-
therapeutic consequences, specifies that well-being is a good that should be 
maximised, and is concerned with autonomy and other rights (Kress, 1999; 
Winick, 1997).  Kress describes therapeutic jurisprudence as a hybrid theory 
incorporating consequentialist, deontological, and rights-based theories.   
Therefore, therapeutic jurisprudence is well placed to be combined with human 
rights.   
 
The normative stance of therapeutic jurisprudence is to maximise the 
overarching aims of the law and it assumes that therapeutic effects are desirable 
and should generally be the aim of the law, and that anti-therapeutic effects are 
undesirable and should be avoided or minimised by the law (Winick, 1997).  
However, therapeutic jurisprudence could be considered normatively neutral as 
when values conflict, therapeutic jurisprudence does not purport to determine 
what should be done, but rather, "…sets the stage for their sharp articulation" 
(Wexler & Winick, 1996, p. xvii) and “…calls for an awareness of these 
consequences and enables a more precise weighing of sometimes competing 
values” (Winick, 1997, p. 191).  In this instance, Winick maintains that an ethical 
or political theory, rather than therapeutic jurisprudence, should establish a 
hierarchy of values.   
 
This perceived neutral normative base in therapeutic jurisprudence has been 
criticised.  Slobogin (1995) indicates that therapeutic jurisprudence inadequately 
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addresses internal balancing (when therapeutic interests fail to converge with 
other interests) and external balancing (when a therapeutic rule for one group 
may not be therapeutic for another group) and Schopp (1999) suggests that a 
normative framework to balance such conflicting values is required.  However, 
Kress (1999) notes that normative questions are contested concepts, a value 
such as autonomy may be incomparable, and no other normative enterprise 
would be able to address this problem anyway.  Nevertheless, La Fond (1999) 
indicates that it is unacceptable for therapeutic jurisprudence to accept other 
social values when anti-therapeutic consequences are severe.  For example, sex 
offender predator laws are so destructive to individual and community well-being 
that therapeutic jurisprudence “…must take a normative stance and assert that 
the law should be repealed or substantially changed…assert its primacy and 
require change regardless of competing values” (La Fond, 1999, p. 378). In this 
instance, La Fond argues that therapeutic jurisprudence must develop a 
normative base to address retributive laws that interfere negatively with the 
human condition.  Similarly, it will be argued that where community rights trump 
human rights in prisoners and detainees with a mental illness, therapeutic 
jurisprudence should balance the two.  Human rights principles can direct this 
balance.   
 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
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Therapeutic jurisprudence considers therapeutic aspects of the law.  Therefore, 
therapeutic jurisprudence would support therapeutic prisons and the 
psychological well-being of prisoners and detainees with mental illness.  
However, very little literature has considered the intersection between 
therapeutic jurisprudence and human rights (see Ferencz & McGuire, 2000; 
Ward & Birgden, 2007; Winick, 2002).  Therapeutic jurisprudence originated from 
consideration of mental health law.  Winick describes the progress of mental 
health law from the medical model (with lack of treatment and human rights 
abuses in institutions) to a legal rights-based model (with improved but vague 
civil commitment and due process standards) to a therapeutic jurisprudence 
model (to balance legal and therapeutic needs of civilly committed patients).  
Winick identifies the convergence between therapeutic jurisprudence and human 
rights values in civil commitment procedures such as liberty, due process, the 
right to treatment and to refuse treatment, and the exercise of decision-making.  
In this analysis Winick concluded that: 
 
The remedy for the abuses in the mental health system of Hungary and 
other Eastern European nations is a healthy dose of international human 
rights law and therapeutic jurisprudence. As that region moves from a 
medical, to a legal, to a therapeutic jurisprudence model of civil 
commitment, we can expect to see reforms in mental health law and 
practice that will both protect individual liberty and promote improved 
mental health and psychological well-being. (Winick, 2002, p. 572) 
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As stated, therapeutic jurisprudence has been criticised for being normatively 
neutral.  A human rights model can assist therapeutic jurisprudence to develop a 
normative base.  Ensuring human rights improves well-being for both the 
prisoner and the community. 
 
Human Rights Model 
 
Virtually no attention has been paid by forensic psychologists to the violation of 
human rights in prisons.  Ward and Birgden (2007) have proposed a human 
rights model to be applied by forensic psychologists in offender rehabilitation.  
The proposed model is the only known one based on human rights principles 
rather than policies.  Based on the work of Gewirth and consequential and 
deontological justifications, Ward and Birgden argue that the individual has the 
right to core values of freedom and well-being in order to function as an 
autonomous and dignified agent.  The core value of freedom entails non-coerced 
situations and internal capabilities (e.g., the capacity to formulate intentions, to 
imagine possible actions, and to form and implement valued plans).  Freedom is 
made up of personal freedom and social recognition.  The core value of well-
being entails meeting physical, social, and psychological needs.  Well-being is 
made up of personal security, material subsistence, and elemental equality.   
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Freedom as a core value includes autonomy.  Autonomy is often overlooked by 
forensic psychologists in prisons and so will be detailed here.  Schopp (1993) 
describes autonomy as a right, a virtue, and a capacity.  As a right, autonomy is 
an entitlement to self-determination (i.e., control of one’s body, family, 
employment, privacy, and property).  As a virtue, autonomy is a set of conditions 
such as self-reflection, direction, reliance, and control; moral authenticity and 
independence; and responsibility for self.  As a capacity, autonomy is a 
necessary condition because an individual who does not have capacity cannot 
exercise rights or develop virtues (and so the state retains authority over the right 
and virtues).  Therefore, autonomy allows the individual to exercise sovereign 
self-determination, develop the virtues of autonomy as a condition, and possess 
autonomous capacities.  Autonomous individuals develop an integrated life (or a 
good life) by reviewing and shaping their projects, motives, and conduct.  
Autonomy may be restricted by lack of rights and capacity (e.g., poor decision-
making) or by lack of rights and virtue (e.g., poor impulse control).  
  
The human rights model proposed by Ward and Birgden (2007) can be applied to 
prisoners and detainees with mental illness.  The revised model is made up of 
policies, objects, and core values (see Figure 1).  Policies articulate legal rights 
based on various declarations of human rights.  For prisoners, the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted by the 
Economic and Social Council in 1957 identifies the basic principles of no 
discrimination (concerning race, colour, gender, religion, politics etc) and respect 
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for the religious and moral precepts of the group to which the prisoner belongs.  
For the treatment of prisoners with mental illness specified legal rules include the 
mentally ill being placed in special institutions under medical supervision, 
medical/psychiatric service providing treatment to all prisoners who require it, 
and medical/psychiatric treatment continuing upon release into the community.  
Figure 1 summarises the minimum standards regarding the treatment of all 
prisoners and detainees.  
  
[Put Figure 1 here] 
 
An individual’s right can be moral (i.e., based on a moral theory or principle), 
social (i.e., guaranteed by a social institution), or legal (i.e., prescribed by 
particular laws).  Human rights literature generally considers legal rights but such 
policy statements do not provide principles to guide forensic psychologists in 
delivering services within a human rights framework.  For example, the health 
and welfare chapter in a prisoner legal rights handbook published in Australia by 
Rosa (2000) lists general and mental health, diet/food, hunger strikes, 
compassionate leave, and marriage of prisoners.  These chapters do not guide 
forensic psychologists in addressing moral or social rights of prisoners.  To 
practice ethically, forensic psychologists need to also consider moral and social 
rights.   
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The core values to guide forensic psychologists are freedom and well-being.  The 
state and duty-bearers (namely forensic psychologists) have an obligation to 
ensure these values to rights-holders (while recognising that rights-holders may 
also be rights-violators).  The five objects in Figure 1 elaborate the two core 
values of freedom and well-being.  Objects are specific rights that have been 
proposed by Orend (2002).  The core value of freedom is made up of personal 
freedom and social recognition.  Personal freedom is the right of individuals to 
rely on their own judgment when deciding how to live a life (although freedom 
may be curtailed while in prison).  Social recognition is the right to direct the 
course of one’s own life, to be treated in a dignified and respectful manner as an 
autonomous agent, and to experience self-respect and self-esteem (we consider 
autonomy to be crucial for all prisoners).  The core value of well-being is made 
up of personal security, material subsistence, and elemental equality.  Personal 
security is the right to physical safety and welfare (e.g., due process rights in law 
and freedom from violence by staff and other prisoners).  Material subsistence is 
the right to basic levels of physical health, food, water, and education (with 
adjustments made to match learning style).  Elemental equality is the right to 
equality before the law and freedom from discrimination (most obviously on the 
grounds of disability but also gender, ethnicity etc).  The two core values of 
freedom and well-being, although lacking to date, ought to be a primary focus of 
forensic psychologists (Ward & Birgden, 2007).    
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The community may consider that prisoners with mental illness have forfeited 
human rights or that their rights may be overridden by the state if the rights of 
non-offenders outweigh them.  However, the prisoner still possesses all well-
being rights and some freedom rights (Ward & Birgden, 2007).  Curtailing some 
freedom rights (through incarceration, parole conditions, or a community based 
sentence) can be justified.  However, any curtailment of freedom rights should be 
rationally justified and based on criteria such as the length of time forfeiture 
occurs, what kinds of rights are forfeited, and whether the state can punish 
beyond the sentence (i.e., a normative consideration).  For the prisoner with 
mental illness, failure to provide competent and specialised medical/psychiatric 
services must also be justified.   
 
In the context of autonomy, Schopp (1993) distinguishes between freedom, 
liberty, and sovereignty.  Freedom is the presence of choices to perform or not 
perform an action (i.e., lack of external personal constraints).  The more options 
an individual has, the more freedom s/he has.  Liberty is the absence of rule-
imposed limits on freedom of action (i.e., lack of legal constraints).  Legal 
systems constrain individual liberty to prevent harm to others.  Regarding 
prisoners with mental illness, the relationship between liberty and freedom can 
be considered in two ways.  On the one hand, the prisoner may have liberty 
curtailed by law but should still have freedom supported through the provision of 
options (e.g., choices of treatment).  On the other hand, the prisoner may be at 
liberty to engage in pro-social behaviours but does not have the freedom to so do 
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because s/he lacks the required skills and environment (e.g., mental state and/or 
environment to support pro-social behaviour).  Based on the described human 
rights model, prisoners with a mental illness are more likely to lack social 
recognition (or autonomy) due to lack of capacity.  Sovereignty is a moral right 
within autonomy.  Sovereignty is the right for the competent individual to 
independently define his or her own projects and the principles by which s/he 
lives (which may merit praise or blame) to define the unique aspect of his or her 
life and well-being.  Sovereignty also supports beneficence in addressing the 
unique human well-being adopted by the individual (not just basic needs such as 
food, shelter, and safety).  To support autonomy, the law should provide a 
degree of freedom and protect liberty otherwise the individual’s sovereignty is 
violated.   
 
Forensic psychologists therefore need to focus on addressing social recognition 
in prisoners with a mental illness.  In addition, curtailing well-being rights (e.g., 
medical/psychiatric care, employment opportunities, quality forensic psychology 
services, and choices) cannot be justified.  It is unethical to assume that 
prisoners’ rights should always be overridden by community rights; the failure to 
provide the minimum level of retained freedom rights and well-being rights is a 
violation of human rights (Ward & Birgden, 2007).  As duty-bearers, forensic 
psychologists have a professional obligation to ensure the rights of rights-holders 
(in this instance prisoners and detainees with mental illness).  In turn, the rights-
holder needs to be able to pursue goals as long as s/he does not infringe upon 
18 
 
 
the rights of others.  If the prisoner is acknowledged as a human rights-holder 
and duty-bearer, as well as rights-violator, then this view will support “rights and 
duties, duties and rights: the ethical foundations of a liberal and flourishing 
community and a fairer and more humane criminal justice system” (Ward & 
Birgden, 2007, p. 642).  
 
Role of Forensic Psychologists 
 
Psychologists are to demonstrate respect for individuals by acknowledging 
their legal rights and moral rights, their dignity, and right to participate 
in decisions affecting their lives (see Australian Psychological Society, 2007). 
However, very little literature has considered the intersection between forensic 
psychology and human rights (see Ward & Birgden, 2007; Perlin, 2005, 2006; 
Perlin & Dlugacz, 2007).  Despite the rapid development of forensic psychology, 
Ward and Birgden have noted that there is a lack of theoretical and research 
attention paid to moral, social, and legal rights in prisoners.  Such concerns are 
particularly applicable to prisoners with a mental illness.  The United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1957) requires prison 
staff to display integrity, humanity, competence, and personal suitability for the 
work.  Forensic psychologists are also required to adhere to codes of 
professional conduct.  Codes are a public commitment by a professional group to 
a particular set of standards and rules and the highest standards of ethical 
practice (Glaser, 2003).  For example, the American Psychological Association 
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ethical code determines that psychologists must recognise “fairness and justice” 
and the Speciality Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists also cover a range of 
professional behaviours (Perlin, 2005), and the Australian Psychological (2007) 
addresses three general principles- respect, propriety, and integrity in its Code of 
Ethics.  In terms of legal consequences for breaching codes, it is rare for forensic 
psychologists to be censured.  In the United States, Perlin (2005) could find only 
two cases where forensic psychologists had been brought before state licensing 
boards for poor professional conduct and one criminal case where professional 
standards were scrutinised.  In Australia, only two states provide publicly 
accessible information regarding professional practice over a period of time.  In 
South Australia, there were 24 cases between 1991 and 2007 but none were 
forensic psychologists (South Australian Psychological Board, 2007).  In Victoria, 
there were 34 cases between 1999 and 2007 and two of these were forensic 
psychologists (Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria, 2007).  One 
psychologist was reprimanded for professional misconduct, later de-registered 
for separate criminal charges, and in 2003 was re-registered with conditions.  
The other psychologist was de-registered for professional misconduct.  An 
additional problem with existing codes is that such standards and rules are not 
based on a theory linking them to human rights. Ward and Birgden (2007) 
suggest that forensic psychologists as therapeutic agents (in therapeutic 
jurisprudence terms) should use the concept of human rights to structure and 
guide the assessment, treatment, and management of offenders (see Ward, 
Gannon, & Birgden, 2007 as an example applied to sex offenders) and ground 
Comment [mlp1]: Astrid: I will not 
have access to this document for a while 
(buit I presume you have it). We need to 
make sure this statement isn’t too broad. 
It sounds right to me in recollection, but 
just need to make sure.. thanks!
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ethical principles for psychological practice (see Ward, Gannon, & Vess, in press 
regarding the American Psychological Association)..  
 
Similarly, the following three general principles of the Australian Psychological 
Society (2007) can support freedom and well-being in practice.  Respect 
considers the rights and dignity of individuals which includes ensuring justice, 
respect, informed consent, privacy, confidentiality, and release of information.  As 
discussed, forensic psychologists ought to respect the prisoner’s right to 
autonomy and justice and promote their legal, social, and moral rights (although 
on occasion these rights may be overridden by community rights).  In 
demonstrating respect, forensic psychologist should ensure impartial allocation to 
adequate treatment rather than act on personal reactions to individual behaviour 
(see Glaser, 2003), recognise that they are agents of the state engaged in a 
community-individual balance (see Birgden, 2007), and recognise uniqueness 
and diversity of each individual (Ward et al., in press).  
 
Furthermore, propriety includes competence, professional responsibility, 
psychological assessment, and competing demands.  In particular, forensic 
psychologists ought to be aware that while informed consent in prisoners may 
include capacity and information, voluntariness without coercion or restraint may 
be vexed (see Birgden & Vincent, 1999).  Integrity includes reputable behaviour, 
communication, conflict of interest, and non-exploitation.  Forensic psychologist 
ought to be competent, protect the rights of prisoners and detainees (i.e., do no 
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harm), and consider that the rights of prisoners and the community take 
precedence over their own interests. 
 
Glaser (2003) distinguishes between treating the punished by providing mental 
health care for prisoners and treatment as punishment by imposing conditions on 
community based orders or parole.  In this context, Glaser states that codes of 
professional conduct for mental health professionals are based on four basic 
principles: (1) autonomy- the client is free from external constraints and can 
make informed voluntary decisions, (2) non-maleficence- avoid harm to the 
client, (3) beneficence- the welfare of the client is the primary goal of treatment, 
and (4) justice- the client is treated fairly, equitably, and in accordance with his or 
her rights and entitlement.  When these principles conflict, the norms and rules 
they produce should be suitably specified to address ethical dilemmas.  As a 
result, Glaser suggests that three broad principles are required in forensic 
settings: (1) provide due process protections; (2) ensure that punishment is 
proportionate to the seriousness of the offence; and (3) minimise infringement on 
freedom rights.  In addition, prison treats individuals as a means not an ends, 
and, if every individual has intrinsic value, then his or her rights should not be 
overridden by other concerns.  A combined therapeutic jurisprudence-human 
rights approach should assist to overcome these problems. 
 
If forensic psychologists do not recognise that the business of corrections is to 
promote and monitor respect for human rights and prevent, detect, and remedy 
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human rights violations, systemic abuses of power will be inevitable (Zinger, 
2006).  Article 15 of the United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of all 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (1988) clearly states that 
no individual should be subjected to torture, to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, or punishment.  However, in the past year, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the attention paid to the issue of the standards of behaviour that 
govern the practice of forensic psychologists (and forensic psychiatrists).  This 
new attention flows mostly from revelations of the sanction of torture at prison 
camps in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghirab by the United State’s government.  
These human rights violations have led to the question of whether this ongoing 
(and fierce) debate will be limited to the extraordinarily important (but clearly, 
relatively narrow) question of the relationship between forensic psychology and 
torture as a function of international human rights law, or whether it will it be 
expanded to a broader inquiry that considers the relationship between 
international human rights law and all professional practice that forensic 
psychologists engage in (Perlin & Dlugacz, 2007).  We suggest that the latter 
should occur, particularly in relation to freedom and well-being. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Institutionalised individuals, particularly prisoners and detainees with mental 
illness, are confined in prison and forensic facilities that regularly and grossly 
violate international human rights standards (Perlin, 2002, 2006, 2007; Perlin et 
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al., 2006; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2007).  Forensic psychology has been strangely- and 
problematically- silent about these abuses, and their impact on the mental health 
and well-being of those so institutionalised (Perlin, 2006).  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence offers a potentially redemptive solution to this state of 
affairs.  We believe that therapeutic jurisprudence principles can, and should, be 
taken seriously to address the human rights problems that we discuss in this 
paper. Therapeutic jurisprudence can suggest therapeutic laws, procedures, and 
roles that maximise the core values of freedom and well-being (and the related 
objects) for prisoners and detainees with a mental illness.  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence offers an intersection between forensic psychology and human 
rights with its normative, humanistic, and inter-disciplinary approach.  
Conversely, the normative base of therapeutic jurisprudence can be 
strengthened by the application of human rights principles regarding moral, 
social, and legal rights and when values conflict, therapeutic jurisprudence ought 
to always support well-being and only accept curtailed freedom as the least 
restrictive alternative.  As duty-bearers, forensic psychologists have a 
responsibility to actively address the panoply of legal rights discussed in this 
paper and to expand their attention to moral and social rights. 
The paper’s title comes in part from Bob Dylan’s epic song, Chimes of Freedom 
(Dylan, 1964), characterized by a leading critic as Dylan’s “most political song” 
and an expression of his “affinity” for a “legion of the abused” (Shelton, 1997, p. 
220, as quoted in Perlin, 2002, p. 432). The verse in question reads, in part: 
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Tolling for the rebel, tolling for the rake 
Tolling for the luckless, the abandoned an' forsaked  
Tolling for the outcast, burnin' constantly at stake  
An' we gazed upon the chimes of freedom flashing. 
(http://bobdylan.com/moderntimes/songs/chimes.html) 
 
The individuals in correctional and forensic institutions about whom we write are 
“luckless,... abandoned, [and] forsaked.” We hope that adoption of the ideas we 
offer here might begin to ameliorate this situation.  
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Figure 1: A Model of the Structure of Human Rights for Prisoners (adapted from 
Ward & Birgden, 2007) 
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